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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

ST ATE OF UTAH
.\IAJ{Y I HWl'A CROJ;'Tt-l.

\

Plaintiff and Ap11ellr111t)
vs.

No. 11 ]f)fi

.J08IAH HOY'l' CROFTS.

\

De.fendant and Rcspu11dnd.}

P~Tl'l'lON

J;'OR

lU~HJ<}AHJNU

Mary Ireta Crofts, the plaintiff and appPllant 111
the above-entitled case, respectfully petitions the court
for a hearing of said casl' upon thP following gronndf'
and for the following reasons:
I. This court obviously and eompletel:• ignored the
record on appeal and the admission and express oral
stipulation of counsel for defendant in connection with
Point III set forth in plaintiff's original brief herein
relating to the incorrect and ummpportable allowance
of $350.00 and $1271.14 as credits on the amount awarded
plaintiff as a settlement of her rights in de.f c11da11(s
property.
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IL This court has cited in support of its refm;al
to direct the entry of a proper and correct Declaratory
Judgment herein with respect to "equities" in the Panguitch home a completely inapplicable Utah Statute and
has ignored controlling and applicable Statutes.
III. This court has misstated and entirely misconstrued the decree of the lower court with respect to
sources of payment of the $10,000.00 plaintiff was
awarded by the divorce decree and as a result has
approved incorrectly and without justification the inadequate and incomplete accounting submitted by defendant.

MATrl'RNON, .JACKSON &
McIFF
GUSTIN & RICHARDS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The facts in this case have been stated quite fully
in plaintiff's original Brief filed herein. However, in
view of the fact that this court has misstated and misconstrued some of the facts involved, we will make further reference thereto in the following argument.
Emphasis and italics throughout this Brief are ours,
unless indicated otherwise.
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ARGUMENrl'
POINT I.
THIS COURT OBVIOUSLY AND COMPLETELY IGNORED THE RECORD ON APPEAL AND THE
ADMISSION AND EXPRESS ORAL STIPULATION
OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IN CONNECTION
WITH POINT III SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S
ORIGINAL BRIEF HEREIN RELATING TO THE
INCORRECT AND UNSUPPORTABLE ALLOWANCE OF $350.00 AND $1271.14 AS CREDITS ON
THE AMOUNT AWARDED PLAINTIFF AS A SETTLEMENT OF HER RIGHTS IN DEFENDANT'S

PROPERTY.

Two sums allowed by the lower court as credits on
the $10,000.00 amount awarded to plaintiff by the divorce
decree were $350.00 and $1271.14 representing one-half
of the amounts realized by the parties from the sale by
them of a Panguitch pasture and a Salt Lake City home,
respectively, held and owned by them as joint tenants.
There is no justification for either of these allowances,
both of which were allowed by this court when it did
not disturb the lower court's findings on the accounting.
These amounts represent plaintiff's one-half of the
net sale proceeds from the sale of two properties, both
owned by the parties as joint tenants. When they were
sold, the plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the net
sale proceeds because she owned that one-half. How
defendant could be granted credit for either of these
amounts is beyond our comprehension. In effect, the
two courts have ruled that plaintiff is required to pay
herself out of her own money. The decree of divorce
~tates that she is awarded the $10,000.00 "as a permaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nent, complete and final settlement of her rights iu the
11ro1Jcrfy of the Dcfcl/(la1d ... ·· but thv lowt•r eomt alHI
this Conrt ha:-; How said that sh<' i:-; n·qnin·d to appl~- JM
own pro pPrt~, 011 the $10,000.00.
The matter is so clear with respect to the $350.00
amount that counsel for defendant conceded the point
in oral argument before this court when he said:
"Now with respect to the $350.00 on the pasture I assume - I assume that - being as Mrs.
Crofts did have horses which were her own property - race horses - I assume that possibly the
$:150.00 should not han· heP11 a eredit, and wP'll
stipulate to that." (Appendi.x p. i.)
In order to remove any possible uncertainty as to
tht· effect of the sti1mlation of eounsel for defrndant,
(·oum;el for plaintiff then said in oral argmuent lwforP
this court:
"Now I understand that Mr. Chamberlain ha~
said here today, which hasn't been admitted previously, that he will stipulate now that the $350.00
should not have been a credit, realized from the
sale of the Panguitch pasture which was owned
jointly by the parties, and he will also stipulate
that the equities will be determined when the
Panguitch home is sold ... " (Appendix p. i)
Counsel for defendant did not disagree with this stale·
ment of this stipulation on either point, but nevertheles~
this court proceeded to allow credit for the $350.00 and
refused to determine when (or how) equities in the
Panguitch home would be determined.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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With respect to the $1271.14 claimed by defendant
and allowed by the court as a credit on the $10,000.00
amount awarded plaintiff, there is no stipulation by
eounsel for defendant that this was an improper credit.
'l'he evidence was contradictory as to whether or not the
partiPs agreed this should be a credit, but as a matter
of law we submit that the allowance of this sum as a
credit is not supportable or permitted. Once again, if
it is allowed as such credit, plaintiff is being made to
pay from her own funds and property amounts due her
by and from defendant out of his property. On the
factual side, counsel for defendant misstated the record
in oral argument before this court in saying:
"They came to Salt Lake City and rather
than rent here they assumed the contract on a
home. This again is in the record. They assumed
the contract on a home and when they left Salt
Lake City in 1956 they sold that contract to a
third party." (Appendix p. i)
We challenge counsel for defendant to find in the record
one single word about assuming a contract on a home in
Salt Lake City and selling that contract to a third party.
There was no such testimony. The truth is that the record shows that the parties bought a home in Salt Lake
City and it was conveyed to them as joint tenants, from
which it would follow that Mrs. Crofts owned the entire
estate for purposes of tenure and survivorship and a
one-half interest for purposes of alienation. (R. 178-9,
258-9, 260, 302.) When they sold that home, each was
entitled in his or her own right to one-half of the net
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lJl'Oceeds. When plaintiff received $1271.14 representing
her one-half interest IN THA '11 HOME (defendant also
rt>ceived and retained $1271.14 for his one-half interest)
~h;c was receiving her own property. She was not recening property of the defendant or a payment by defe11da11t
from or out of his property. In effect, the court has said
to plaintiff: "You are required to pay this $1271.14 to
yourself out of your own property, and we are going to
allow defendant credit for that sum on what he owes you
out of his property." This is not what the divorce decreP
provides and this is not the law.
Furthermore, there was absolutely no consideration
for any understanding, whatever it was and regardless
of whether the lower court believed the plaintiff or the
defendant as to the application of this $1271.14 as a
credit on the $10,000.00. Defendant testified that tht
total paid for the parties' equity in the Salt Lake home
was paid in two checks, each made payable to both of
the parties, and that they endorsed "each other's check
at that time. It was made in two checks, one for her
and one for me." (R. 254). Plaintiff has now been required to pay to herself for the credit of the defendant
th13 $1271.14 represented by "her" check. If the salr
proceeds did not belong to both plaintiff and defendant.
why were the checks made payable to both of tlwm and
whv did they includP her as a payee?
The divorce decreP did nut award to <kfendant tlw
plaintiff's one-half interest in these properties. It did
not even mention these properties, but the court has
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-/
now tahn thl'lll frorn lwr. Tt awarded plaintiff $10,000.00
in settlement "of her inter<:>sts in the property of the de-

fendant." The court has taken from plaintiff a Constitutional right:
ARTICLE XXII, Section 2 of the Constitu-

tion of Utah reads as follows:

"Real and personal property of every female
acquired before marriage, and all property t~
which she may afterwards become entitled by
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance or devise, shall
be and remain the estate and property of such
female, and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations or engagements of her husband, and may
be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her as if
she were unmarried."
Despite this, the court has now required plaintiff to use
her property to pay the debt of the defendant.
26 Am. Jur. 665-6 and 681 clearly states that a married woman's property includes the proceeds of a sale
thereof. The Cole v. Cole case (1942) 101 Utah 355, 122
P2d 201) cited by counsel for both parties refers to
certain property owned as community property by husband and wife, and points out that since it was not mentioned in the decree, findings or conclusions." ... the
decree could have no effect on the holding or ownership
of the stock. ... "
Even if the court believes defendant's testimony as
opposed to that of plaintiff as to the claimed agreement
that the $1271.14 (and this would also apply to the $350.00) was to be a credit on the $10,000.00, there was no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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<'onsideration to SU]J]Jort any such agreement. It is fundamental and elementary law that there must be a benefit
to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. 12
Am. Jur. 570, Sec. 79. What benefit was there to Mr~.
Crofts and what detrimrnt was therv to Mr. Crofts for
an.'- agreernent snd1 as that claimed by .illr. Crofts to tlw
<'ffect that Mrs. Crofts would allow these amounts she
alread.'· owned and was entitled to as a credit on thP
amount Mr. Crofts already owed to her. rrhe answer
is ohvions. 'l'ht>re must be some right, interest, profits or
bem•fi t accruing to .l'ilr:-;. Cr of ts or some forbearance,
dl'triment, loss, or responsibility gi\'en, suffered or nndPrtaken by Mr. Crofts. Here, there was neither. As
stated in 12 Am. Jur. 57;3 referred to above:
"' ... Any benefit conferred or agr('e<l to be
l'onf erred upon the promisor (Mrs. Crofts) by
an.'· other person to which the lJromisor is not
lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered or
agreed to be suffered by such person (Mr. Crofts)
other than such as he is at the time of consent
lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the
promisor, is a sufficient consideration for ~he
JJI'Ornise ... •Benefit' as used in this connect10.n
means that the promisor has, in return for his
promise, acquired some legal right to which h.P
-would not otherwise have been entitled; "detnmPnt' means that the prornisee has, in return for
the promise, forborne sonH_' legal right which. he
would otherwise have been ('ntitled to exercise.

"

our <.'as<', the promise<' (Mr. Crofts) did not forego
nnY advantage or henefit or part with a right he might
otl.ierwis<' exert. He gan up nothing when Mrs. Crofts
J 11
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n·<·<'i n~d tlw prort><'ds from tlw sale of her ow11 property.
She received no benefit when she merely received that
which she was already entitled to receive.
POINT II.
THIS COURT HAS CITED IN SUPPORT OF ITS
REFUSAL TO DIRECT THE ENTRY OF A PROPER
AND CORRECT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
HEREIN WITH RESPECT TO "EQUITIES" IN THE
PANGUITCH HOME A COMPLETELY INAPPLICABLE UTAH STATUTE AND HAS IGNORED CONTROLLING AND APPLICABLE STATUTES.

In its opinion, this court has held that there cannot
be a declaratory judgment upon a judgment and then
proceeds to cite in support thereof two Utah Statutes.
Keitht>r one is applicable. Instead, the matter is controlled by other statutory sections not cited by the court:
This court states that "it is not included within the
tPrn1s of the statute permitting declaratory judgments"
and then cites Section 78-32-2, U.C.A. 1953, which reads
as follows:
"Any person interested under a deed, will or
u:ritten contract, or whose rights, status or other
legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchi:;c, may havl'
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance contract or franchise and obtained a declarati~n of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder." (Emphasis added - by the court.)
The quoted section does not have even the most
remote connection with the matter before this court. It
is clearly inapplicable. Instead, the matter is controlled
by the following applicable statutes:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
"78-33-1. Jurisdictiu11 of district crJurls _
Effect: -_- 'l'he district eourts withi 11
theu re::; 1Wd1ve JUn::;dictions shal I ha Ye power to
declare rt(Jhts, status, and other legal relations.
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
No actw11 or proceedings shall be ope11 to obj 11.
tw11 01t th'.' ground that a declarator:IJ judgmc t
11
ur decree is L!(({Jfr'd for. Tht> dP('laration may hr·
<·ither affirmative or rn_.gative i11 form and effect:
and snch declarations shall havP the force and
<>ffect of a final judgrnPnt or dt>cre<'." ( I~mJJha~i.'
ours.)
,

I' 0~·111

''78-33-5. Hnumeration i11 1Jreccdi11g scct/011.1
no restriction on court's .rJl'ncral powers - Tlw

<'numeration in NPdions 7S-:38-:2, 7S-:3:-l-3 and 7~33-4 does not limit or restrict the exercise of thl'
qeneral zw wcrs conf errcd i11 S cct io 11 78-:)3-1 in an~
proceeding where declaratory rl'lief is sought, in
which a jndgrnent or decree will terminate the controversy or remove the nncPrtaint!··'' (Em pha8i~
ours.)
"78-33-12. Chapter to be liberally construed.
-This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford n•lief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, statnc
and other legal relations, and is to be liheral11
construed and administered."

In the light of these three applicabl<· statntvs, which
vrnong other things make it more than clear that Section
78-33-2, cited by the court in its opinion and which obvionsl!T does not apply in any event because WP are not
concerm·d with any of the documents Hwntioned therein.
does not limit or. restrict the power and duty of the
court to dedare rights of the parties with resprct to
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11
the Panguitch home and to knninate tht>
and removp the uncertainty with respect
tlll'reto, we feel that this court will not want its original
11pinion herein to stand. The statutes are so clear that
no citation of authority appears to be necessary, but wt>
do rdt>r the court to Stifler v. Stieler (Minn.) 70 N.W.
~d 127, a 1955 decision which holds that in a divorce
case a part~- may move the court for an interpretation
and clarification of the judgml'nt where it is ambiguous
(Jr uncertain in its terms or is of doubtful meaning or
ll!H:'n to diverse constructions, and Anderson's Declaraton; Jurlqmcuts, page 600, paragraph 202 states as fol"<«jltities in

1·untrowrs~·

lows:

"A declarator~- j udg1m•n t action will lie to
eonstrue and determine the meaning of a judgment rendered where the same is indefinite or
uncertain, and a construction thereof is necessary
for the stabilizing of the rights, liabilities and
IPgal relations of the parties."
\\-P \rnuldn't bl' before this court if the decree in this
<·asl' <lid not n'4nirl' construction. By a further admis~ion made in oral argument before the court (Appendix

p. ii) eounsel for defendant has now conceded that
"<·quitit>s" are to be determined when the home is sold ~0111pthing ht> and his client had not conceded previously
and which is not part of the determination of the lower
r·omt in its declaratory judgment herein - and that
"equities" will then be determined by deducting the balance then remaining due on the note and mortgage on
th<· home - something again not conceded previously
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I:..'

and which again is not part of the declaratory judgmen'
herein. We sought a determination of this point ana
have been denied it. Because defendant was ordered u
pay all of the dc!Jts. i11cl1uli11g the 11wrtgu9c 011 the farni/,,
home at Panguitch, we argued before the lower court ann
on appeal that only costs of sale were to be deducted
in determining "equities" when the home was sold bu1
that another possible interpretation was that "equities'
should be determined by deducting from gross sale pro
eeeds the costs of sale and the balance remaining due
I•\•deratPd ~ecurity lrnmrance Company at the ti111t oi
.jale, this being the only mortgage on the home when
the decree was entered. Defendant in his accounting
(R. 91, 92) introduced another "debt" which he clai.me<l
was an "encumbrance" on the home, but which obviously
is not the case because all it consisted of was a promis·
sory note signed by plaintiff and defendant to defend·
ant's partnership, J. E. Crofts & Sons, and was there·
fore merely a "debt" he was ordered to pay under the
terms of the divorce decree. Recognizing the weakness
of this contention, counsel for defendant apparently has
conceded in oral argument before this court that de·
fendant 111nst keep up tlH· pa_nm·nts on the home accord·
ing to the terms of the one note and mortgage thereon
which existed when the divorce decree was entered and
that "equities" will be determined when the home is sold
by deducting from gross sale proceeds the expenses of
sale and the balance then remaining due on the one and
only mortgage debt (to Federated) at that time. The
minimum we are entitled to is a declaratory judgment

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

] .u
')

to that effect, although we urge that the court is in
,•rror in not requiring defendant to pay the entire mortgage debt before determining equities. The divorce decree, in its uncertain and unsatisfactory language, re15nlted in differing constructions. The purpose of the
Declaratory Judgments Act is to remove that uncertainty. We are not asking for a determination of what
the "equities" will be when the home is sold. That cannot be determined until it is sold, but we are entitled to
!mow the formula and the method of determining "equities" at that time, which items should be resolved now
by this court in making an interpretation of the language
of the divorce decree.
The next statute cited by the court in its opm10n
herein is Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953. In support of its
statement that the finality of judgments must be respected, the court quotes the following part of said
Section:
'' ... Such subsequent changes or new orders
may be made by the court with respect to the
disposal of the children or the distribution of
property as shall be reasonable and proper."
Here again, the statute quoted by the court is inapplicable. We are not attacking the finality of the judgment.
Since a dispute has arisen as to the construction of the
divorce decree, we are asking what it means. That is
why we have a Declaratory Judgments Act. The lower
court, under the guise of interpreting the decree and in
defining "equities," modified and amended the decree by
changing "note and mortgage" (one only) to "indebted-
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nesses" - whatever that may mean - and did not ever.
determine when "equities" were to be determined. ,~
determination of that question now will accomplis~
exactly what the Declaratory Judgments statutes abow
y_uoted expressly declare to be their purpose. As statei
in Stieler v. Stieler, supra.
POINT III.
THIS COURT HAS MISSTATED AND ENTIRELY
MISCONSTRUED THE DECREE OF THE LOWER
COURT WITH RESPECT TO SOURCES OF PAY·
MENT OF THE $10,000.00 P LA I NT I F F WAS
AWARDED BY THE DIVORCE DECREE AND AS
A RESULT HAS APPROVED INCORRECTLY AND
WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION THE INADEQUATE
AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNTING SUBMITTED BY
DEFENDANT.

In its opinion, this court, in approving the account
ing and in not allowing interest on the $10,000.00 or
any part thereof, amended and modified the divorci
decree by misstating its express terms as follows:
The divorce decree (Appellant's Brief p. 28) awarded
the plaintiff $10,000.00 and then continued:
'' ... which sum shall be paid by the def enda~t
to the plaintiff out of profits arising from b~st·
ness interests held by the defendant and which
profits are actually distributed and received by
the defendant and shall be immediately due ana
payable out of the sale of business assets ?f the
Defendant to third parties and actual receipt b)
the Defendant of said sale proceeds. Said amount
shall be payable at the rate of 50 per cent of the
gross sale r)roceeds until said $10,000.00 has been
· f u 11 ... "
pa1·d m
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Thi:,; elearly stated two sources of funds "out of'' which

the money was to be paid: (1) "out of profits" and (2)
''out of the sale of business assets." The next sentence
merely svecified and limited the payments out of sale
procP<·d,; to 50% of tlll' grm:s sale proceeds. The opinion
of this court states in the third to the last paragraph
thereof:
.. . . That decree specifically provided that
the amount was to be paid out of profits from
business interests and profits from salt> of business assets ... "
We respectfully submit that the court's statement of
what the decree svecifically provided is a complete departure from what it actually said. There is not even
a word stated about "profits from sale of business
a:,;sets." The reference is to "gross sale proceeds" from
the sale of business assets. The word "profits" is used
in connection with "business interests held by the defendant and which profits are actually distributed and
received by the Defendant." The court did go on to say
that interest did not begin to run until plaintiff had a
right to the money, which implies that she did have a
right to interest from the date she had a right to the
money. How can plaintiff determine what interest is
due on the basis of the so-called accounting submitted
by defendant (R. 87-8-9, 90-1) which says in effect that
no profits have been realized and then makes no mention
of gross sale proceeds but mentions certain small "capital gains." Plaintiff is not interested whether any sale
resulted in capital gains or losses. She is entitled to
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know what the "gross sale proceeds" were from any sal€,
made, whether reported by defendant in his income tfil
returns as capital gains or losses or not reported becaus,
m·ither a <'apital gain or lo:s:s l'l':stilted. We havl• specifie
a nnmher of tin1es the accounting we are entitled to ir
order to determine just what interest is due plaintill
assuming she was not entitled to interest on the $10,
000.00 award from date of judgment. It has been ordereD
that we be furnished with such an accounting, but insteao
of getting the same we have been given further assur
ances that we would be furnished a further accounting.
We continue to wait for it - something definitive enougn
to show not only when and what profits were receiv~
''from interests held" but also when and what "gros~
sale proceeds" were received from "the sale of businesf
assets to the defendant to third parties." Certainly,
plaintiff is entitled to some interest. The amount cannot
be determined until and unless defendant is required fo
make and does make a meaningful accounting covering
both profits and gross sale proceeds. Plaintiff's Re·
quest and Notice (R. 148-149-150-151) sets forth whal
we feel she is entitled to.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that even though we believe
the court's opinion is erroneous in holding that plaintif!
was not entitled to interest on the $10,000.00 from the
date of the divorce decree, because it constituted a judg
ment for a fixed amount and is clearly distinguishable
under the rulings of this court and numerous other
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wurts from an alimony or support money award payable
in monthly or other periodic sums, at least there is some
basis for the court's ruling on this question. With respect to the other items, however, stated as Points herein,
we submit that the court's determinations are clearly
erroneous. Defendant, under the facts and law applicable to this case and the stipulation of his counsel, is
not entitled to credit for the $350.00 and $1271.14
amounts on the $10,000.00 he was required to pay to
plaintiff. The court should determine when and how
"equities" in the Panguitch home are to be determined
when it is sold - and at the very least, should determine
that when it is sold, "equities" are to be determined by
deducting at that time two items and two only, namely,
expenses of sale and the balance then remaining due on
the only mortgage debt, that to Federated, which existed
when the divorce decree was entered, and that in the
meantime defendant be required to make all of the payments thereon in accordance with its terms. The court
should require a meaningful accounting which would
enable plaintiff and the court to determine just what
interest she is entitled to on the $10,000.00 amount
awarded to her.
Defendant still owes plaintiff the sum of $4,563.84
tlireceted by the lower court to be paid to her and we
urge that thi:,; Jw paid irnmedi,ately and unconditionally,
1't>g-ardlP:o>8 of the eonrt'8 ruling on this Petition, in order
to avoid any additional accrual of interest thereon or
any question with respect thereto.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We res1Jeetfully urge that this court grant a reh~ar
ing and upon such rehearing that it make and enter,
new and revised opinion in conformity with plaintiff.
contentions herein.
Hespedfully submitted

MATTSSON, JACKSON&
McIFF

<JUSTIN & RICHARDS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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APPENDIX
J1;xeerpt::;

from transeript made of argnmenb of Krn
( 'ltamherlain, eounsel for defendant, and Carvel Mattsson, eounsel for plaintiff, hefon~ the Utah Suprenw
Conrt on September 12, 1968 - taken from verbatim
transaipt of recording made at that time:
Mr. Chamberlain:
"Going next to the matter of t>(tnities in tltt> honw,
the deerPe vrovided that Mr. Crofts would pay a eertain
figure for alimony, a certain fignre for :rnpvort money,
and he - that he would pay the mortgage payments on
the home. Neither one of them happened to be living in
Panguitch at the time. Later Mr. Crofts returned to
Panguitch and two of the children came back from Arizona to live with Mr. Crofts in Panguitch. They never
sold the home. '11 hey have not ::;old the home as yet, but
the two provisions in the Decree are entirely consistent,
one with the other, that if the home is sold then tht>
equities will be decided, and I have cited in my brief a
number of cases which hold that the definition of the
term equity is the gross value of the sale price less any
valid indebtednesses against the property, and I think it
is premature here to determine what the indebtedness
is going to be when it is sold. We admit that if Mr.
Crofts stays in the home for the next ten years that
Mrs. Crofts' equity is going to be considerably larger
because he will have paid down the principal balance on
the mortgage materially by the time it is sold. If Mr.
Crofts stays there until the lawful indebtednesses a~e
paid off on this property (record turned over at this
point and a few words were missed) ... provide that
the property will be held in joint tenaney until it is sold
as is herei~after provided, so it is entirely - both of
thest' in·ovisions are entirely consistent Mr. Crofts has
the obligation of keeping those payments up. 'rhey cer-
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tai1.1l:· di~1't !ntend that .Mr. Crnfts wonkl mature tJ1,
enti~e obhgat10n due on this mortgage and pay it in,
~ned1atel)-. He was to pay household obligations inclua
mg the nott:> and mortgag·e and all he has to do witi
respect to the notl' and mortgage is !Jay it according t•
its terms and according to those rates . . . .
"Now coming to tht> two - the last two rnattern tha
Mr. Mattsson mentioned, then~ was a home which M1
and Mrs. Crofts owned in Salt Lake Cih .... They carn1
to Salt Lake City and rathPr than rent J{erP they a~smnt11
the contract on a home. 'l'his again is in the record
They assumed the contract on a home and when the1
left Salt Lake City in 1956 they sold that contract to;
third party. . . . Now with respect to the $350.00 on tbf
pasture I assuuw - [ assume that - being as Mr1
Crofts did have horses which were her own property race horses - l assume that possibly the $350.00 shoula
not have been a eredit, and wt->'ll stipulate to that. .. ·
Mr. Carvel Mattsson:
"Now l understand that frolll what Mr. Chamber
lain has said here today, which hasn't been adrnittea
previousl:·, that he will stipnlak now that the $35M
:-;hould not have been a credit, realized from the sale ol
the Panguitch vastnre which wa::,; owned jointly h)· tht
partie8, and he will also 8tipulate that the equities will b~
determined wheu the Panguitch home is 8old. It's been
np in the air - it's been uncertain a::,; to ·when e4mtm
would lw determined. Of (•ourse, we don't - if onh
<·o::,;ts and PXJ>en8PS of ::,;ale arP to he deducted, tlH:'ll thal
-- that point is moot, hut if thP not!' and rnortgagi
ind<>htt>drn,s:-1 whicl1 Mr. Crofb \\·a~ unh,rt>d to pa~· 1 ~
deducted, thPn that point ean lw i!llportant lw<'ause ]I!
\\·ill Jw n'dncing tlH' nott• a11d 111ortgagP i11d(•)1h•drn·~~ a..
tune
goes on. "
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